Electronic Data Theft: A Legal Loophole for IllegallyObtained Information—A Comparative Analysis of
U.S. and E.U. Insider Trading Law
Carolyn Silane†

I. Introduction ............................................................................. 333
II. History of United States Insider Trading Law ....................... 336
A. The Traditional Theory of Insider Trading:
“Disclose or Abstain” by Corporate Insiders.................. 341
B. Liability of Tippees: Expanding the Fiduciary
Relationship .................................................................... 343
C. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
Liability: A Further Extension ....................................... 344
D. Implications of the Fiduciary Requirement .............. 347
III. European Union Directive And National Legislation:
Fiduciary Relationships Not Required........................................ 351
A. European Union Directive ........................................ 351
B. Implementing Legislation in European
Member States ................................................................ 354
IV. Implications in United States Enforcement .......................... 363
V. Conclusion ............................................................................. 367

I. INTRODUCTION
Early in the morning of October 17, 2007, a computer hacker
invaded the online systems of Thomson Financial (“Thomson”), which
disseminates earnings reports and other press releases for publicly-traded
corporations. The hacker began probing Thomson’s confidential files for
an anticipated earnings release from IMS Health Inc., a NYSE company,
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but to no avail.1 Repeated attempts failed to yield this material nonpublic information, as IMS Health had not yet sent it to Thomson, who
was to keep it confidential until 5:00 p.m. when the earnings information
would be released to the investing public. Shortly after 2:00 p.m.,
however, when Thomson received and uploaded this information to a
confidential server, it became vulnerable to the hacker’s final foray, just
minutes later. Within twenty-seven seconds of the upload, the hacker
broke through Thomson’s security system, and downloaded the
unfavorable earnings report.2
By 2:52 p.m., the alleged hacker, a Ukrainian citizen named
Oleksandr Dorozhko, began purchasing $41,670.90 in put options of
IMS Health,3 betting that the share price would drop significantly.
Unsurprisingly, when the public learned of the information later that
afternoon, the stock price sank almost 30 percent, at which time
Dorozhko sold the put options at a net profit of $286,456.59.4 Given the
suspicious and successful nature of Dorozhko’s trades contemporaneous
with the earnings release, the brokerage house immediately froze his
account and contacted the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
“Commission”). Soon after, the Commission began a formal inquiry,
eventually filing a civil claim for insider trading in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Southern
District Court”).5 Those undisputed facts would appear to present an
open-and-shut case of unfair trading on material6 non-public
information—more colloquially known as “inside” information.
The Southern District Court, however, held otherwise. When the
Commission moved to freeze Dorozhko’s assets, United States District
Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald ruled that the Commission was not likely
to succeed on the merits of the case brought under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) given the status of judicial
precedent in this area, and denied the requested preliminary injunctive
relief. In sum, Judge Buchwald stated that Supreme Court case law
1
SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 07 Civ. 9606, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2008).
2
Id. at *11–12.
3
“A put option is the right to sell a security at a specified price; thus, the value of a
put option increases as the price of the underlying security falls.” Magma Power Co. v.
Dow Chem. Co., 136 F.3d 316, 321 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998).
4
Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *13–14.
5
Id. at *14.
6
“‘Materiality’ depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on
the withheld or misrepresented information,” and is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988). The Commission recently established
Rule 10b5-1, making clear that liability under 10(b) does not require the Commission to
prove that a person actually used material non-public information, mere possession of the
information while making a purchase or sale of a relevant security is sufficient to create
the assumption of such use. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-1(b) (2009).
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required the Commission to establish a relationship of trust or confidence
between Dorozhko and either the issuer of the securities in which he
traded, or with the source of his information. Without that requisite
fiduciary relationship, no violation of the Exchange Act could have
occurred. Judge Buchwald stayed her ruling to allow the Commission to
appeal before Dorozhko’s ill-gotten gains were released from U.S.
custody (and lost for good).7
On February 27, 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(the “Second Circuit”), without issuing a published opinion, stayed Judge
Buchwald’s decision, and allowed the asset freeze to remain in place
pending a determination of the merits of the preliminary injunction.8
Until the Second Circuit determines otherwise, the status of the law
under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act remains as aptly stated by the
Commission in their reply brief to the Second Circuit:
[T]he principal drafter famously paraphrased the
statute as ‘Thou shalt not devise any other cunning
devices.’ Now, nearly 75 years after the passage of
the Exchange Act, defendant offers a startling new
reading of the law: what Congress actually meant is
‘Thou shalt not breach any fiduciary duty; absent
such a duty, thou mayest lie as much as thou
wishes.’9
Just as easily as Dorozhko slipped through Thomson’s online
security networks to obtain confidential information, he also seems to
have slipped through a loophole in U.S. insider trading law to remain
entirely free of such liability. Even as courts use their creativity to stretch
the existing precedent to its logical extreme, so long as there continues to
be a requirement of a fiduciary duty and a breach of that duty, there will
remain a significant loophole as evidenced by Dorozhko. Because
information thieves and, notably in this era of internet commerce,
electronic information thieves, owe no duty to the company about which
the information pertains, nor to the source of the stolen information, they
are able to exploit this antiquated legal framework to trade on the
informational fruits of their crimes with material information unknown to
the trading public. The regime as it exists today in the United States
creates a paradox wherein those who have obtained information in an
illegal manner may trade on it without fear of liability under the
Exchange Act whereas those who have obtained the information in a
legal fashion are prohibited from doing so.
7

Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *16 n.6,*64.
SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 08-0201-CV at 1 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2007).
9
Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant SEC, SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 08-CV-0201, at 2
(2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2008).
8
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This article discusses the history and future implications of the
status of this law as it now exists in comparison to the securities laws of
the European Union (“E.U.”), which have effectively closed this gap in
insider trading liability. Section II reviews the history of insider trading
law in the United States, including the original intent of those who
drafted the Exchange Act in reaction to the stock market crash of 1929,
and how judicial interpretation of the Exchange Act has followed and
expanded upon such intent. Section III discusses the securities laws of
the E.U., and how E.U. legislators have updated insider trading
prohibitions to defend against modern abuses in this area, in contrast to
U.S. law. Finally, Section IV discusses the distinction between E.U. and
U.S. law, and the implications of U.S. law as it currently exists.
II. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES INSIDER TRADING LAW
In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, the United States
Congress enacted the Exchange Act, which notably contained Section
10(b), prohibiting the use of any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in connection with a purchase or sale of any security.10 Many
of the Congressional hearings prior to the passage of the Exchange Act
centered around combating corrupt and deceptive practices in the
securities industry, which Congress largely blamed for the market
crash.11 Although more recent studies indicate that political motives may
have been at play in exaggerating the presence of these abuses, there was
ample evidence that corporate insiders were abusing their access to
inside information to garner personal profits.12
The Exchange Act generally defines one of its principal purposes as
“insur[ing] the maintenance of fair and honest markets.”13 Similarly, in
10

15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
JAMES D. COX, DONALD C. LANGEVOORT & ROBERT W. HILLMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (5th Ed. 2006). For example, Senator Duncan
Fletcher (D-Fl), the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency at the
time the Exchange Act was drafted, declared that investigation into the securities industry
exposed various corrupt practices including unfair methods employed by those in
possession of inside information regarding “corporate affairs” which had operated “to the
great detriment of the investing public” and contributed to investor losses. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 73d Cong. Sess. 2 (1934) (statement of Sen. Duncan U. Fletcher,
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency).
12
Id. at 6; see also Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange
Act, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 343 (1999).
13
15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006); see also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002)
(internal citations omitted) (“Among Congress’ objectives in passing the Act was to
insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence after the market
crash of 1929. More generally, Congress sought to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry.”); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658
(1997) (“[The] purpose of the Exchange Act [is] to insure honest securities markets and
thereby promote investor confidence.”).
11
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establishing the subsequent and explanatory Rule 10b-5—commonly
understood as the prohibition against insider trading—the Commission,
acting under its rule-making powers as delegated by Congress,14
explicitly stated that its purpose was “to assure that dealing in securities
is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors.”15
Despite these statements indicating a more general intent of market
equality, much of the Congressional focus in drafting the Exchange Act’s
prohibition of insider trading was on a more narrow concern about
abuses by those in fiduciary relationships to the company with access to
non-public information.
For example, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency stated in his Committee Report that “[a]mong the most
vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was
the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of
corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential
information which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their
market activities.”16 Additionally, he commented that “[t]he bill . . . aims
to protect the interests of the public by preventing directors, officers, and
principal stockholders of a corporation, the stock of which is traded in on
exchanges, from speculating in the stock on the basis of information not
available to others.”17 The Chairman of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce similarly pointed to the abuses by
fiduciaries in saying that “[s]peculation, manipulation, faulty credit
control, investors’ ignorance, and disregard of trust relationships by
those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries, are all a single seamless
web. No one of these evils can be isolated for cure of itself alone.”18 He
continued to stress this point in remarking that:
14
15

322.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975) as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321,

16
S. Rep. No. 73-1455, at 55 (1934). Fletcher also noted that the Committee was
aware that directors and officers were not the only persons in possession of confidential
information, and that large stockholders, who had sufficient control over their companies,
were also to blame for “the unscrupulous employment of inside information” which was
uniquely available to them. See id. Thus, continued Fletcher, “[t]he Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 aims to protect the interests of the public against the predatory operations of
directors, officers, and principal stockholders of corporations by preventing them from
speculating in the stock of the corporations to which they owe a fiduciary duty.” Id.
Those owing a fiduciary duty were entrusted with money from the investing public,
making their exploitation of confidential information particularly unfair. Recognizing that
such “unscrupulous” individuals may continue to exploit their inside information “by
devious and underhanded methods,” the Exchange Act would function at the very least to
“tend ultimately to drag these devices into the open where they may be dealt with
according to their desserts.” Id.
17
See S. Rep. No. 73-792, at 8–9 (1934).
18
H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 5-6 (1934) (Rayburn) (arguing that the “exploitation
of . . . ignorance by self-perpetuating managements in possession of inside information”
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A renewal of investors’ confidence in the exchange
markets can be effected only by a clearer
recognition upon the part of the corporate managers
of companies whose securities are publicly held of
their responsibilities as trustees for their
corporations. Men charged with the administration
of other people’s money must not use inside
information for their own advantage.19
Despite the stated intent of ensuring market fairness as generally
described in the text of the Exchange Act, in the decades since Congress
promulgated the law, courts interpreting insider trading prohibitions have
mirrored the concerns of the Committee Reports, stressing the
unwavering requirement that a fiduciary duty be breached in order to
establish insider trading liability.20 There simply is no “general duty
between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on
material non-public information.”21
Specifically, the Exchange Act prohibits one from using or
employing “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . .
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”
Rule 10b-5 explained further that it is unlawful for any person to “[t]o
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.”22 Because there is no explicit
prohibition of “insider trading” per se, the rule against such conduct has
been inferred by courts interpreting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-523 based
on their language and intent. Simply put, a violation requires the
Commission to establish three elements: (1) a “device or contrivance”;
was to blame at least in part for the disastrous consequences of recent speculation in
securities markets).
19
Id. Similar to Fletcher’s concession (see n. 16 supra), Rayburn admitted that the
insider trading prohibitions were not “air-tight,” leaving the possibility that the
“unscrupulous insider” may continue to exploit confidential information. However, the
Exchange Act aimed to shed light on the abusive practice of insider trading, bringing
these methods into “disrepute and encourage[ing] the voluntary maintenance of proper
fiduciary standards by those in control of large corporate enterprises.”
20
See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (declining to impose
a general duty on all market participants to forgo trading on material non-public
information because “such a broad duty . . . should not be undertaken absent some
explicit evidence of congressional intent. As we have seen, no such evidence emerges
from the language or legislative history of § 10 (b)”). See also Kathleen Coles, The
Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 184 (arguing for a move away
from the “fiduciary-based rationale” to a “fairness-based system” of liability).
21
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
22
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
23
See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199
(1976).
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(2) which is “manipulative or deceptive”; and (3) used “in connection
with” the purchase or sale of securities.24
The focus of this article is on the legal terminology contained in the
second prong of the prohibition, “manipulative or deceptive.” It therefore
assumes that there has been a subsequent “purchase or sale”25 while the
individual was in possession of the so-called “inside” information,26 and
that electronic hacking qualifies as a “device or contrivance.”27 The
Supreme Court has defined the term “manipulative” very narrowly in the
area of securities law, generally requiring “intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially
affecting the price of securities.”28 Thus, to fit an act of insider trading
under the rubric of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 it must be
“deceptive.”29
Although the common understanding of the term “deceptive” would
appear to include the scenario described above as perpetrated by
Dorozhko, Supreme Court precedent makes it abundantly clear that a
breach of a fiduciary duty, or some derivation thereof,30 must occur for
conduct to be deemed “deceptive.”31 This interpretation stems from the
historical understanding of fraud, which encompasses “deceptive”
conduct, as implying a duty to “disclose or abstain.”32 In other words,
any actor in a relationship of trust with another party shall either disclose
24

Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *18–19.
See infra at Section IIB. As is evident in the chart of implementing legislation infra
at Section IIB, the E.U. Directive and Member States have prohibited the passing of
inside information even where there is no subsequent trading on such information; merely
the act of disclosing the information is a civil or criminal violation. Given the potential
conflicts in United States law, most notably with the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, this stands as another stark contrast to the U.S. liability scheme but is
beyond the scope of this paper to analyze in depth.
26
United States law defines what is colloquially known as “inside” information to be
“material non-public information.” See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
27
A “device” under the first prong is a requirement easily established in the
circumstance of electronic data hacking pursuant to the Supreme Court’s definition as
“that which is devised or formed by design; a contrivance; an invention; project; scheme;
often, a scheme to deceive; a stratagem; and artifice.” Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 n.
20 (internal citations omitted). Courts have held that electronic hacking to obtain
information qualifies as an artifice or scheme, with the requisite intent. See, e.g.,
Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *18.
28
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199; see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 465,
476 (1971) (explaining that the terms “manipulative” “refers generally to practices such
as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices that are intended to mislead investors by
artificially affecting market activity”); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1,
6 (1985).
29
See, e.g., Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *20–22.
30
See Section IIA–B for a discussion of the various derivations of confidential
relationships for purposes of insider trading law.
31
See, e.g., Zandford, 535 U.S. at 825; O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655; Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 222; Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 470.
32
See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
25
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the material information at stake or abstain from continuing the
transaction. Growing from these common law roots, judicial
interpretation of insider trading law now requires that a relationship of
trust exist before an individual is required to disclose his confidential
information, and thus before a violation of law can occur.33 Subsequent
courts have become more creative in finding the requisite fiduciary
relationships, expanding upon the “traditional theory” under which
company insiders could be held liable given the fiduciary relationship
they owe to their shareholders.34 These interpretations include assigning
liability to “tippees” to whom information was given by a corporate
insider,35 and even go so far as to include those who have
“misappropriated” inside information, but who do not have any
relationship to the company whose securities are at issue, instead
breaching a duty of trust only to the source of the information.36
A brief history of the development of U.S. insider trading law
illustrates the difference between U.S. law and that promulgated by the
E.U. Unlike the E.U. which had the unique ability to adapt its regulations
to comport with modern technological and other advances, U.S. insider
trading laws, and the precedent thereunder, are constrained by legislation
adopted nearly eight decades ago.

33

See, e.g., id. at 228–29; Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group,
Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 1999).
34
Simon DeBartolo Group, 186 F.3d at 169 (citations omitted) (internal quotations
omitted) (“Under the ‘traditional theory’ of insider trading, this prohibition is limited by
the requirement that the defendant be under a specific duty either to disclose or to abstain
from trading. This duty does not, however, arise from the mere possession of material
non-public information. Rather, a duty to disclose or abstain arises only from a fiduciary
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between the parties to the transaction.”).
35
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646; see also United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 320 (7th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 593 (6th Cir. 2007) (“the Government
was also required to prove that . . . tippees: (1) received material, confidential, and nonpublic information from [the tipper] knowing that he was the source; (2) knew or should
have known that [the tipper] breached his fiduciary duty; and (3) knowingly and willfully
purchased or caused to be purchased shares of . . . stock based on that information.”);
SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003); Randall v. Rational Software Corp., 34 Fed.
Appx. 301 (9th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that, to
affirm a tippee’s liability under § 10(b), the SEC must establish that (1) the tipper
possessed material non-public information; (2) the tipper disclosed this information to the
tippee; (3) the tippee traded in the shares of the company about which the material nonpublic information pertained while in possession of that information provided by the
tipper; (4) the tippee knew or should have known that the tipper violated a relationship of
trust by relaying the information; and (5) the tipper benefited by the disclosure to the
tippee); United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 1995) (“an individual need
not have a direct relationship with the company to violate the securities law by trading on
inside information; a ‘tippee’, one who acquires information from an insider, may also
violate the rules against inside information.”).
36
See, e.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642; SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir.
2008); Simon DeBartolo Group, 186 F.3d at 171.
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A. The Traditional Theory of Insider Trading:
“Disclose or Abstain” by Corporate Insiders
The traditional theory of insider trading liability has its roots in the
“disclose or abstain” rule at common law. In the landmark case of In the
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co v. SEC, the Commission relied upon the
special relationship of trust owed by a corporate insider to the
shareholders of his company to support its finding that a director of a
securities issuer is prohibited from executing trades in such securities
while in possession of information not yet known by the investing
public.37 That duty arises from the existence of a relationship that
provides access to the inside information, which is intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and the unfairness of a corporate
insider taking advantage of that information by trading without
disclosing it.38 Thus, it follows that those insiders must either disclose the
material non-public information known to them because of their unique
position in the company, or abstain from trading entirely.
The “traditional theory” of insider trading law states simply and
logically that a corporate insider violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
when he or she trades in the securities of his or her corporation on the
basis of material non-public information.39 Trading on such information
that is not generally known to the investing public, and which would
substantially affect the judgment of a reasonable investor, qualifies as a
“deceptive device” due to the relationship of trust and confidence
between the shareholders of a company and the insiders of that company
who possess confidential information due to their position within the
company.40 Included under the umbrella of corporate insiders are not
only the officers, directors, or other similarly situated employees of a
particular company,41 but also the attorneys, consultants, accountants, or
other persons who can become temporary fiduciaries of the company.42
These “temporary insiders” adopt a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of
the company for which they are providing services by virtue of their
business relationship and access to confidential information.43
37

In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, at 10 (S.E.C. 1961) (“We, and the courts
have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them
by virtue of their position by which are not known to persons with whom they deal and
which, if know, would affect their investment judgment.”).
38
Id. at 912 n.15.
39
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
40
Id.
41
See id.; O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52.
42
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.16; O’Hagan 521 U.S. at 652; see also United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991).
43
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 (“Under certain circumstances, such as where
corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or
consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons
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In confirming this theory of insider trading liability, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Chiarella noted its historical roots, explaining
that at common law, fraud exists where affirmative misrepresentations
are made to induce the reliance of another party or where the offending
party fails to disclose material information prior to a transaction when
that party has a duty to do so.44 The duty to disclose is found where the
offending party is in possession of information “that the other party is
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust
and confidence between them.”45 Given the Commission’s recognition of
a relationship of trust and confidence between a corporate insider and the
shareholders of the insider’s company, the insider has an obligation to
disclose given “the necessity of preventing an insider from taking unfair
advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders”46 or simply when
the insider takes advantage for his or her own benefit.47 Thus, the
Chiarella Court stated that the “application of a duty to disclose prior to
trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to
place the shareholder’s welfare before their own, will not benefit
personally through fraudulent use of material non-public information.”48
In so deciding, the Supreme Court overruled the determination of
the Second Circuit which had affirmed Chiarella’s conviction,
disregarding the need for a fiduciary duty. Instead, the Second Circuit
relied on the core principle that U.S. securities laws were supposed to
have “created a system providing equal access to information necessary
for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions.”49 In effect, such a
acquired non-public corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given
access to information solely for corporate purposes.”).
44
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–28. This case concerned an employee of a printing
company who, by reading takeover bids being printed by his employer, deduced the
names of target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella bought stock in
the target companies, and subsequently sold such stock shortly after the takeover attempts
were made public. For his realization of over $30,000 in profit over the course of
fourteen months, Chiarella was indicted for seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act, and was found guilty of all counts. In overturning his conviction,
the Supreme Court held that “one who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so.” Id.
at 228. Stating this in the reverse, one must affirmatively breach some brand of duty
because he or she can be held responsible for fraud in connection with Section 10(b).
45
Id. at 228 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
46
Id. at 228–29 (citing Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.
1951)).
47
Id. at 229.
48
Id. at 230. The jury instructions charged the jury with deciding whether Chiarella
used material non-public information when “he knew other people trading in the
securities market did not have access to the same information.” Id. at 231 (citing R. at
677). These were found to be erroneous, given the absolute requirement of a breach of
fiduciary relationship.
49
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1358, 1362 (2d. Cir. 1978). This theory of
providing equal access was outlined previously by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas

2009]

ELECTRONIC DATA THEFT

343

premise would have imparted “a general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on material non-public
information.”50 This theory, though embraced by legislators around the
world in creating schemes for insider trading liability based upon general
equality among market participants,51 was expressly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Chiarella because the “[f]ormulation of such a broad
duty, which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty
arises from a specific relationship between two parties, should not be
undertaken absent some explicit evidence of Congressional intent.”52 As
discussed above, such intent was heavily premised on fiduciary
relationships. With the majority decision requiring such a relationship,53
U.S. insider trading law irrevocably turned away from the notion of
general fairness in the market place, a concept embraced by nearly every
other developed nation,54 toward the more limited framework mandating
a fiduciary relationship.
B. Liability of Tippees: Expanding the Fiduciary Relationship
The Supreme Court used this traditional theory as a jumping off
point to extend liability to “tippees”, or those persons to whom a
corporate insider has passed information, but who do not otherwise have
any duty to the company about which the information pertains.55 In order
to satisfy the fiduciary requirement, courts have adopted the theory that
the tippee assumes the liability of the fiduciary relationship between the
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding Section 10(b) “applicable to
one possessing the information who may not be strictly termed an ‘insider’ . . . anyone in
possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public,
or . . . must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such
inside information remains undisclosed.”). Additionally, this is precisely the reasoning
accepted by Justice Blackmun dissenting in Chiarella, arguing that Section 10(b) does
not require a fiduciary relationship. See note 53, infra.
50
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
51
See Section IIIA, infra.
52
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. That the Court found “no such evidence” of a “parityof-information rule” in either the language or legislative history is unsurprising, given the
heavy emphasis on traditional insiders of the Congressional Committees as discussed at
Section II supra.
53
Justices Blackmun and Marshall, dissenting from the majority opinion, argued that
the longstanding principle that federal securities laws are to be construed flexibly
dictates, and that their purpose is “to ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal
national securities markets where common-law protections have proved inadequate.” Id.
at 247–48 (Blackmun, J., Marshall, J, dissenting). The simple fact that the defendant
“stole” information was “the most dramatic evidence” of fraud, thus formulating a far
broader rule that those persons having access to information not legally available to
others should be prohibited from exploiting such position by trading in the relevant
securities. Id. at 246–51. “To hold otherwise . . . is to tolerate a wide range of
manipulative and deceitful behavior.” Id.
54
See Section III, infra.
55
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659–64.
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corporate insider and the company when such insider passes the
information along.56 In Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court found that the
tippee “assumes a fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of the
corporation not to trade on material non-public information only when
the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should
know that there has been a breach.”57
For example, in United States v. Evans,58 a financial analyst at
Credit Suisse, Paul Gianamore, passed along material non-public
information to a long-time friend, Ryan Evans, who subsequently traded
on that information for a handsome profit.59 Although Evans, the
“tippee,” did not owe a fiduciary relationship to Credit Suisse, as a
corporate insider Gianamore did, and breached that duty when he passed
along material non-public information.60 Upon receiving the information,
knowing that Gianamore had breached his own fiduciary duty to Credit
Suisse, Evans assumed Gianamore’s fiduciary duty to the company’s
shareholders and was ultimately found guilty for his trading activities.61
C. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability:
A Further Extension
Continuing to expand the relationships that may qualify under
Section 10(b), the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan set forth a
“complementary” theory to the traditional understanding of insider
trading law in the “misappropriation theory.”62 The Court held that a
violation occurs when an actor misappropriates confidential information
for the purpose of securities trading, in breach of a duty owed to the
source of the information, rather than requiring a relationship to the
shareholders themselves.63 As the Supreme Court stated, an

56

Id.; see also United States v. Falcone, 257. F.3d 226, 229–30 (2d Cir. 2001).
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
58
United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 320–26 (7th Cir. 2007).
59
Id. This case presents the ironic scenario where the tippee may be held liable for
insider trading while the tipper is not held accountable. Because the legal standard
focuses on the tippee’s knowledge that the tipper is breaching a fiduciary duty—not the
tipper’s knowledge that his actions constitute such a breach—a scenario such as this may
arise where the tipper acted innocently and the tippee is the only party ultimately
culpable.
60
Id. at 323.
61
Id.
62
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
63
Id. Although O’Hagan is widely recognized as the seminal case defining the
misappropriation theory, the first time the theory was briefed was in Chiarella, where the
Commission argued the requisite breach of trust exists where an outsider breaches a duty
to the corporate insider who gave him the information, which would replace the breach
owed to the market participant under the traditional theory. See Dorozhko, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *31–32. Although adopted by Justices Blackmun and Marshall in
57
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“undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or
sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty or confidentiality, defrauds
the principal of the exclusive use of that information.”64 By moving away
from requiring a relationship between an insider and the shareholders,
the Court affixed liability to the “fiduciary-turned-trader” when such a
person is entrusted with access to confidential information, regardless of
any relationship to the shareholders, and breaches the trust with source of
the information by trading on it.65
In O’Hagan, the defendant acquired material non-public
information in the course of representing the potential acquiring
company in a possible tender offer.66 Prior to the public release of
information about the deal, O’Hagan purchased call options67 in the
target company’s stock, thus earning a profit of $4.3 million when the
deal was made public.68 Despite the fact that O’Hagan was found guilty
under Section 10(b) at the District Court level, the Eighth Circuit
dissent, the majority refused to consider the theory because it had not been submitted to
the jury. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235–36.
64
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
65
Id. The duty of trust need not be owed to the original source of the information.
See, e.g., Talbot, 530 F.3d at 1093. The courts have found that a “continuous chain” of
duties may suffice to extend liability to information recipients who are connected to the
issuer only through a chain of information passing. In that way, a defendant may be held
liable when he owes a duty to the source of information, who in turn owes a duty to the
issuer. See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 406 (former employee of a bank liable
when he breached a duty to his employer by misappropriating information concerning the
bank’s clients and traded on such); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1984)
(employee of a financial printing company liable under misappropriation theory when he
traded on information regarding clients of his employer); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp.
425, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (misappropriation theory applied to law firm employee
who traded on information about firm’s clients). The Ninth Circuit has extended this rule
in holding that there need not even be a “continuous chain” so long as there is a duty
owed to the defendant’s source, regardless of whether the source is the “originating
source” or not. Talbot, 530 F.3d at 1093 (finding misappropriation theory applicable
where a board member of an insurance company traded on information about a lending
service in which the insurance company owed a 10% stake when he learned of the
information from officers of his company who originally learned of the information from
officers of the issuer).
66
“A tender offer is a broad solicitation by a company or a third party to purchase a
substantial percentage of a company’s Section 12 registered equity shares or units for a
limited period of time. The offer is at a fixed price, usually at a premium over the current
market price, and is customarily contingent on shareholders tendering a fixed number of
their shares or units.” SEC, Tender Offers, http://www.sed.gov/answers/tender.html (last
visited June 5, 2009); see generally 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d); 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-e.
67
“A call option gives the holder the right to purchase a specified number of shares
of stock by a certain date at a specific price. If the shares are not purchased by that date,
the option expires and along with it the right to purchase the specified number of shares.
For instance, on August 18, 1988, O’Hagan purchased 100 Pillsbury call options. Each
call option gave him the right to purchase 100 shares of Pillsbury stock. Each call option
also expired on September 17, 1988, if the option was not exercised.” O’Hagan, 92 F.3d
at 612, 614 n.1 (8th Cir. 1996).
68
Id.
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reversed his conviction.69 Following the Fourth Circuit’s lead in United
States v. Bryan, which rejected the misappropriation theory,70 the Eighth
Circuit accepted the defense’s argument that O’Hagan was not an insider
of the target company, whose stock he had traded, and therefore the
requisite fiduciary duty was missing.71 Noting the split amongst the
Courts of Appeal on the feasibility of the misappropriation theory, 72
however, the Supreme Court responded with another reversal. Expanding
the fiduciary requirement to further protect investors against trades made
unfairly with confidential information, the purpose of the
misappropriation theory is to “protect the integrity of the securities
market against abuses by ‘outsiders’ to a corporation who have access to
confidential information that will affect the corporation’s security price
when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that
corporation’s shareholders.”73 Soon after the O’Hagan decision, the
Commission enacted Rule 10b5-2, further clarifying where a “duty of
trust or confidence” exists.74 The regulation delineated which
relationships would be encompassed within the misappropriation theory,
and included instances where: (1) there is an agreement to maintain a
confidence, (2) a relationship between the parties exists such that
confidence is expected, or (3) there is a familial relationship.75
With this decision, the Court continued moving toward imposing
broader liability on unfairly advantaged market participants. Given the
enduring requirement of a breach of some form of loyalty or trust,
69

Id. at 612.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995)(narrowing the scope of liability, despite “the
principal concern of Section 10(b) [being] the protection of purchasers and sellers of
securities,” because the statute requires “deception” upon a person in some way
connected to a securities transaction, beyond merely a fiduciary breach to a source of
information).
71
O’Hagan, 92 F.3d at 612.
72
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650 n.3 (noting the split between the Fourth Circuit in
Bryan, 58 F.3d at 943–59 (1995), and the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
respectively in Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566, SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir.
1991), and SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (1990)).
73
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653. Given this stated purpose, however, the Court had to
squeeze the misappropriation theory into the required framework of deceit in connection
with a securities transaction through a breach of fiduciary duty. See Donna M. Nagy,
Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: a Post-O’Hagan
Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1273 (1998). Nagy argues that the Court’s emphasis
on the harm to investors is misleading because the fraud upon which the Court relied was
actually perpetrated on the source of the information with whom the duty of trust existed.
Id. As this article argues, the Court is stretching the fiduciary relationship to its logical
extreme to encompass as much unfair conduct as possible. In effect, however, the
misappropriation theory, though disguised as a breached duty is simply a “backhanded
way to penalize individuals for reducing investor confidence in the securities markets and
for treating investors unfairly.” Id. at 1274.
74
17 C.F.R. § 24010b5-2(b).
75
Id.
70
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however, the misappropriation theory does not go so far as to impose a
general scheme of market fairness. For a “misappropriation” of
information to occur, there must be a breach, and for the breach to occur,
the misappropriator must not disclose to the source of the information his
intention to trade in the company’s securities.76 The Court, bound by
precedent to uphold the fiduciary requirement, was well aware that
scenarios would exist in which those with an unfair trading advantage
would not be liable under Section 10(b). For example, Justice Ginsburg
specifically mentioned a potential situation in which the source of the
information was informed that the recipient planned to trade on the
confidential information.77 Because there would no longer be a breach of
the source’s confidence, this situation would yield no liability under the
misappropriation theory. The Court merely deferred to the possibility of
claims under state law to close this gap.78 Furthermore, some form of a
relationship must exist between the source and the misappropriator, thus
foreclosing liability for those without any association whatsoever, as
would be the case for an electronic data hacker like Dorozhko.
D. Implications of the Fiduciary Requirement
The story of Oleksandr Dorozhko “highlights a potential gap
arising from a reliance on fiduciary principles in the legal analysis that
courts have employed to define insider trading, and courts’ stated goal of
preserving equitable markets.”79 When the Commission launched an
76

See generally, O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642.
“[F]ull disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory: Because
the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the
source of the information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on
the non-public information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no 10(b) violation.”
Id. at 656; see also id. at 659 n.9 (“[T]he textual requirement of deception precludes
10(b) liability when a person trading on the basis of non-public information has disclosed
his trading plans to, or obtained authorization from, the principal—even though such
conduct may affect the securities markets in the same manner as the conduct reached by
the misappropriation theory.”).
78
For example, New York State prosecutes insider trading violations under the
Martin Act, its Blue Sky Law. See, e.g., People v. Napolitano, 724 N.Y.S.2d 702, 708
(1st Dep’t 2001); People v. Florentino, 456 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982). Rather
than expanding upon the scheme of liability under federal law, however, New York Law
essentially mirrors existing federal law, leaving the same loopholes available to true
outsiders. See id.; see generally, In re Novich, 728 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (1st Dep’t 2001)
(finding a “federal conviction for securities fraud . . . is ‘essentially similar’ to the New
York felony under the New York State insider trading statute.”).
79
Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *4–5; see generally Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (“The Court has said that the 1934
Act and its companion legislative enactments embrace a fundamental purpose to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry . . . the Court noted
that Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to
be construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
77
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investigation, and eventually pursued civil claims against Dorozhko,
Judge Buchwald of the Southern District Court effectively had her hands
tied by Supreme Court precedent. While noting the availability of
possible criminal charges for mail or wire fraud,80 or for hacking under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,81 Judge Buchwald denied the
Commission’s request for a preliminary injunction to freeze the profits
made by Dorozhko on the IMS Health trades, finding that the
Commission was not likely to succeed on the merits of proving a 10(b)
violation. In doing so, Judge Buchwald stated that,
in the 74 years since Congress passed the Exchange
Act, no federal court has ever held that the theft of
material non-public information by a corporate
outsider and subsequent trading on that information
violates § 10(b). Uniformly, violations of § 10(b)
have been predicated on a breach of fiduciary (or
similar) duty of candid disclosure that is ‘in
connection with’ the purchase of sale of securities.
To eliminate the fiduciary requirement now would
be to undo decades of Supreme Court precedent,
and rewrite the law as it has developed.82
Notwithstanding Judge Buchwald’s assertion that no federal court
had ever ruled in contradiction to her position, Judge Haight, also of the
Southern District Court, had issued an opinion under extraordinarily
similar facts just one year prior. In that case, SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd.,83
the Commission alleged that the defendants, a Guernsey citizen and the
Hong Kong company for which he worked, “fraudulently gained access”
by “hacking” or “otherwise improperly obtaining electronic access” to
material non-public information from imminent news releases stored on
computer systems.84 Judge Buchwald did not ignore Judge Haight’s
opinion, but noted that the Dorozhko case was distinct in procedural
posture since Blue Bottle was a default judgment. Judge Buchwald also
asserted that Judge Haight did not “produce[] an opinion analyzing the
purposes.”); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971).
80
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006). Penalties for mail and wire
fraud include a fine and a prison sentence up to 20 years. Id.
81
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006). A first-time offender may be fined and imprisoned
for up to 5 years; however, a second conviction under this title may result in a fine and
prison sentence up to ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(3)(A)-(B).
82
Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *4.
83
SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd., No. 07-CV-1380, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95992
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007).
84
Id.; Court Orders Temporary Restraining Order and Asset Freeze in SEC
Emergency Fraud Action Involving Trading in Advance of Press Releases of 12 U.S.
Companies; Foreign defendant garnered profits of over $2.7 million through illegal
scheme, SEC Litigation Release No. 20018 (Feb. 26, 2007).
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relevant case law, or why the theft of material non-public information
amounted to a deceptive device in contravention of the statute,” thus
rendering his judgment “hardly convincing.”85 Judge Haight did in fact
publish an opinion in connection with the ruling, relying heavily on the
Zandford and Dirks cases which Judge Buchwald also cited
extensively—but the two judges arrived at precisely opposite
conclusions.86 Without specifying whether the hacker was an “insider,”
“temporary insider,” “tippee,” or “misappropriator,” Judge Haight
outlined the relevant precedent and asserted that the Commission
successfully established liability.87 In contrast, Judge Buchwald analyzed
and rejected both the traditional and misappropriation theories of
liability, ultimately concluding that Dorozhko was a complete outsider,
without any requisite duty to either the stockholders of IMS Health nor to
the source of the information. Thus, according to Judge Buchwald, the
Commission was not likely to succeed in holding him liable under
Section 10(b) for his acts of information theft and subsequent trades
thereon.88
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Commission argued that
“Dorozhko’s hacking was deceptive within the meaning of Section 10(b)
regardless of whether he breached a fiduciary duty.”89 The Commission
argued that such conduct was “deceptive” because it was a “deceptive
trick to gain access to non-public information as if he were one of those
few persons authorized to have that access,”90 and because he had to
“retrieve the information, and secretly depart from the compromised
computer system.”91 Attempting to frame its understanding of hacking as
“deceptive” within the meaning of Section 10(b), the Commission argued
that this is not a radical departure from established law as Judge
Buchwald had so firmly asserted in her opinion.92 Noting that each of the
cases upon which Judge Buchwald relied involved a defendant with
lawful access to non-public information, the Commission drew a
distinction in Dorozhko’s case where the deception involved could be
found in the means by which he accessed the information.93 The
Commission argued that Dorozhko’s actions amounted to more than a
“straightforward theft” of information, alleging instead there was an

85

Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *52.
Blue Bottle, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *12–14.
87
Id. at *13–14.
88
Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *63–64.
89
Brief on Behalf of Petitioner-Appellant SEC Motion for Maintenance Pending
Appeal, SEC v. Dorozhko, at 11 (Jan. 11, 2008)(appellate number unpublished).
90
Id. at 13.
91
Id. at 12.
92
Id. at 14–15.
93
Id. at 16–18.
86
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added element of deceit.94 The Commission asserted that this situation
was akin to using an expired magnetic identification badge to gain access
to non-public information,95 similar to the facts in SEC v. Cherif, where
the Seventh Circuit found the defendant’s actions to have deprived
another person of something of value “by trick, deceit, chicane or
overreaching.”96 What the Commission failed to note, however, was that
Cherif exploited confidential information he learned as an employee of
his former company to break in and steal information about forthcoming
transactions.97 The Seventh Circuit stressed that he was not a “true
outsider” as Judge Buchwald characterized Dorozhko.98
The Second Circuit, without a written opinion, stayed Judge
Buchwald’s decision, thereby temporarily allowing the asset freeze to
stay in place pending a final decision on the merits of the preliminary
injunction.99 The standard for granting a stay of the freeze pending
appeal requires a lower standard of probability of success on the merits
than does a preliminary injunction.100 Whereas the Commission’s request
for a preliminary injunction in the Southern District Court required “a
likelihood of success on the merits,”101 a standard not met according to
Judge Buchwald, the standard for granting a stay pending appeal requires
only “a substantial possibility, although less than a likelihood, of
success” on the merits of the appeal.102 Citing this standard without
further analysis, the Second Circuit thus recognized that there is at least a
“substantial possibility” that 10(b) liability may exist. In addition to the
likelihood of success on the merits, however, three other factors weigh in
a court’s determination of a stay pending appeal, including whether the
movant (here the Commission) would suffer irreparable injury absent a
stay, whether the respondent would suffer substantial injury if a stay is
issued, and whether public interests may be affected.103 Keeping the
freeze in place would not inflict any further harm on Dorozhko, and there
is a strong argument to be made that the public interest is served by
prohibiting an alleged hacker from disappearing with his ill-gotten gains.
Practically speaking, the Second Circuit may simply have been acting to
preserve the Commission’s access to the funds in question, which
94

Brief on Behalf of Petitioner-Appellant SEC Motion for Maintenance Pending
Appeal, SEC v. Dorozhko, at 15 n.6 (Jan. 11, 2008)(appellate number unpublished).
95
Id. at 16–17.
96
SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 411–12 (7th Cir. 1991).
97
Id.
98
Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *41.
99
SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 08-0201-CV (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2008)(order granting stay of
asset freeze).
100
LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1994).
101
Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *16.
102
LaRouche, 20 F.3d at 72.
103
Id.
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otherwise would likely be impossible to recover should the freeze be
lifted.104 Whether the stay is an indication of how the Second Circuit
ultimately will rule remains an open question to be answered shortly.105
This case presents a unique and novel opportunity for the Second Circuit
to either solidify the existing law as explained by Judge Buchwald, or, as
it did previously in its opinion in Chiarella, move judicial interpretation
towards a fairness-based approach.
III. EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION:
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS NOT REQUIRED
A. European Union Directive
In contrast to the precedent interpreting U.S. insider trading laws,
European law explicitly seeks to achieve market fairness and
transparency for investors.106 In doing so, the E.U. expressly declared
that an individual simply may not trade on insider information regardless
of how such information was obtained.107 Recognizing the endless
possibilities of exploitation of confidential information in this age of the
internet,108 the E.U. has created a statutory scheme of liability more
encompassing than that of the United States with respect to electronic
data thieves.109 Without any requirement of a breach of duty, the E.U.
focuses instead on whether a person was merely in possession of inside
information when a trade occurs.110 The legal disposition of Dorozhko
104

Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *16 n.6, *64.
As of the date this article went to press, the Second Circuit had not yet issued an
opinion on the merits of the preliminary injunction.
106
See Press Release IP04/16 Market Abuse: Commission Adopts First Implementing
Measures, Brussels (Jan. 7, 2004) (listing among the priorities of the EU Directive to
“establish a strong commitment to transparency and equal treatment of market
participants.”).
107
Council Directive 2003/6/EC, Arts. 2-4, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 21.
108
“New financial and technical developments enhance the incentives, means and
opportunities for market abuse: through new products, new technologies, increasing
cross-border activities and the Internet.” Id. at L 96/16.
109
Of course, a scheme of liability is only as effective as the enforcement mechanism
in charge of prosecuting offenses, and the existence of statutory liability does not
necessarily mean offenders are held responsible. For example, between 1995 and 2000,
there were only 13 successful prosecutions of insider trading violations across 17
European nations. See infra note 111. Each nation places differing levels of priority on
prosecuting such violations, as is evidenced by the fact that the Commission’s budget is
almost 50 times larger than that of Germany’s federal regulator. Id.; see generally Utpal
Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, J. OF FIN., 75–108
(2002), Table I (demonstrating the existence of insider trading laws in many nations
which do not actively prosecute cases of such); see also Bernard Black, The Core
Institutions That Support Securities Markets, 55 BUS. LAW. 1565, 1576–78 (2000)
(arguing that viable enforcement mechanisms are critical for a strong public securities
market).
110
See Section IIIB, infra.
105
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and others who surely will follow his example highlight this point, as
E.U. law would likely impose liability for his conduct.
In January 2003, upon an overwhelming consensus on the need for
clearer guidelines,111 the E.U. published an official directive on insider
trading and market manipulation for the stated purpose of promoting
investor confidence (“E.U. Directive”),112 explicitly outlining the
prohibited conduct and to whom the prohibitions apply. Promulgated by
the European Parliament and the Council of the E.U., this prohibition
was required to be implemented in substantially similar form by each
individual member nation of the E.U. (“Member State”) in its own
national legislation.113 In order to effect a seamless cross-border system
of enforcement, the E.U. Directive mandates that all Member States
apply the requirements contained in the E.U. Directive to all actions
carried out in the territory of the home state, or those actions carried out
abroad when such conduct concerns financial instruments traded on a
regulated market within the home state.114 Additionally, each Member
State must include in its proscription of insider dealing all relevant
conduct carried out in its territory concerning financial instruments that
are admitted to trading in another Member State.115 Thus, under the E.U.
Directive and the implementing legislation in each Member State, any
act of insider trading occurring within any Member State is prohibited.
Unlike the United States, the E.U. has soundly rejected any
requirement of a fiduciary duty in favor of a straightforward rule against
an imbalance of information in securities transactions. The E.U.
Directive requires that Member States prohibit those in possession of
inside information from:
(1) Using that information, by acquiring or disposing of (or
attempting to acquire or dispose of) any financial instrument
to which the information relates, either directly or indirectly,
and either for his own account or on account of a third party
(“insider dealing”); 116
111
New Curbs on Insider Trading, Market Abuse Agreed to by E.U. Parliament. 34
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 432 (2007) (noting that the draft legislation won preliminary
approval in the European Parliament by a vote of 398-3).
112
“An integrated and efficient financial market requires market integrity. The smooth
functioning of securities markets and public confidence in markets are prerequisites for
economic growth and wealth. Market abuse harms the integrity of financial markets and
public confidence in securities and derivatives.” Council Directive 2003/6/EC, 2003 O.J.
(L 96) 16.
113
See Council Decision 1999/4681/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 184) (promulgating procedures
for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission).
114
Council Directive 2003/6/EC, Art. 10(a), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 23.
115
Id. at Art. 10(b), L 96/23.
116
Id. at Art. 2(1), L 96/21. Where the individual involved in this situation is a legal
entity, this prohibition also applies to the natural persons who partake in the decision to
carry out the transaction on behalf of the legal entity involved. Id. at Art. 2 § 2, L 96/21.
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(2) Disclosing that information to any other person unless
such disclosure is made in the normal course of the exercise of
his employment, profession or duties (“disclosing insider
information”);117 or
(3) Recommending or inducing another person, on the basis of
such information, to acquire or dispose of financial
instruments to which that information relates (“tipping”).118
Much like the definition of material non-public information as
commonly understood in the United States, inside information under the
E.U. Directive is information that: (1) is precise in nature; (2) has not
been made public; (3) relates directly or indirectly to a financial
instrument or an issuer of such; and (4) if it were public, would be likely
to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or
on the price of related derivative financial instruments.119
Importantly, these prohibitions apply to an expansive group of
persons, far beyond traditional corporate insiders, including those who
possess inside information by virtue of their membership of the
administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer or
through their employment or other professional duties, or by virtue of
holding stock in the issuer.120 The E.U. Directive also includes those who
possess inside information by virtue of criminal activities.121 In fact, the
E.U. Directive explicitly stresses the importance of including those cases
of insider dealing where the information at issue originates not from a
profession or function, but from criminal activities.122 Additionally, as an
expansive catch-all, the directive includes as potential insiders those who
knew, or should have known, that the information they possess is
considered inside information—termed “secondary insiders.”123
Entirely sidestepping any requirement for a relationship between
the actor and the issuer, or the actor and the source of his information,
the E.U. Directive encompasses more conduct than would be prohibited
under U.S. law, notably with respect to information thieves.124 Those,
117

Id. at Art. 3(a), L 96/21.
Id. at Art. 3(b), L 96/21.
Council Directive 2003/6/EC, Art. 1 § 1, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 23. The E.U. definition
however, lacks the subjectivity contained in the U.S. definition, substituting the judgment
of the “reasonable investor” for a more objectively defined effect on market price.
120
Id. at Art. 2, L 96/21.
121
Id.
122
“As regards insider dealing, account should be taken of cases where inside
information originates not from a profession or function but from criminal activities, the
preparation or execution of which could have a significant effect on the prices of one or
more financial instruments or on price information in the regulated market as such.” Id.
at L 96/17 (17).
123
Id.
124
Council Directive 2003/6/EC, Art. 2, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 21.
118
119
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like Dorozhko, would qualify under both the criminal and secondary
insider provisions, making conduct such as his actionable anywhere
within the E.U.
Complying with the E.U. Directive, each Member State has
accordingly enacted implementing legislation.125 Because the E.U.
Directive did not specify whether it applied to civil or criminal penalties
or both, Member States’ legislation vary on the penalties imposed. For
instance, the United Kingdom promulgated criminal sanctions for insider
trading violations in 1993.126 Although the United Kingdom only
established civil liability in 2000, and thereafter revised the civil scheme
to comport with the guidelines of the E.U. Directive in 2003, the criminal
liability system has remained unchanged.127 Regardless of the differing
penalties at stake, each of the Member States has implemented the
requirements of the E.U. Directive into their legal schemes in some
fashion to prohibit, among other things, insider trading.128
B. Implementing Legislation in European Member States
A sampling of implementing legislation in E.U. Member States
illustrates how the E.U. Directive has been applied on a national level.

125
See Committee of European Securities Regulators, Report on Administrative
Measures and Sanctions as well as the Criminal Sanctions available in Member States
under the Market Abuse Directive (Oct. 17, 2007).
126
HM Treasury, U.K. Implementation of E.U. Market Abuse Directive, June 2004 §
3.4.
127
Id.
128
See supra note 125.
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National Legislation Implementing the European
Union Directive 2003/6/EC on Insider Dealing and
Market Manipulation129∗
Austria:
Financial Market Authority (“FMA”)
Civilly Liable Conduct

Civil Penalties

The FMA has the right to seek administrative
penalties for any violation of insider trading
laws as defined by the criminal law.1

Administrative penalties include the public
disclosure of insider trading offenses.2
Additionally, the FMA has the right to order the
exchange operating company3 to suspend trading
in a financial instrument at issue in an
investigation of insider dealing.4

Criminally Liable Conduct

Criminal Penalties

Any insider, whether primary or secondary,
may not take advantage of inside information
before the public has knowledge of the inside
information, by:
•
buying or selling the financial
instruments concerned to a third party
or offering to buy or sell these to a third
party, or recommending such action
with the intention of gaining a
pecuniary benefit for oneself or a third
party (“insider dealing”); or
•
making this information accessible to a
third party without having been ordered
to do so with the intention of gaining a
pecuniary benefit for oneself or a third
party (“disclosure of inside
information”);5 or
•
using such information in the manner
described in paragraphs 1) or 2) with

Criminal penalties for primary insiders in violation
of insider dealing or disclosure of information
provisions include:
•
a prison sentence of up to three years, or, if
the pecuniary benefit gained exceeds
€50,000, a prison sentence of six months to
five years.10

129

Criminal penalties for secondary insiders in
violation of insider dealing or disclosure of inside
information provisions include:
•
a prison sentence of not more than one year,
or, if the pecuniary benefit gained exceeds
€50,000, the punishment shall be a prison
sentence up to three years; or
•
a fine of not more than 360 times the daily
fine rate as set by the court;11
Criminal penalties for negligent insider dealing

Other industrialized nations have enacted securities laws which do not require a
fiduciary duty per se like the United States, but still require the individual to be either a
corporate insider or the recipient of information from a corporate insider to assign insider
trading liability. See, e.g., Securities and Futures Ordinance Ch. 571, Law No. 12 of
2003, § 285 (2003) (Hong Kong); Kin’yū shōhin torihiki-hō [Financial Instruments and
Exchange Law], Art. 166 (2007) (Japan); Securities and Exchange Act of 1962, Act No.
972 of 1962, Arts. 188-2, 207-2 (2005) (Republic of Korea); § 72 of Securities Services
Act of 2004 (South Africa); Securities and Exchange Act Arts. 157-1, 171 (Taiwan).
Australia, however, appears to be more closely aligned with the E.U. in defining an
insider as a person who possesses inside information and knows, or ought reasonably to
know that the information he or she possesses would be qualified as inside information.
See Corporations Act, 2001 Div. 3 Part 7.10 § 1042 (Austl.). Thus, a “complete outsider”
may be subject to liability even where there is no relationship at all to either the
stockholders or the source of the information.
∗ References and authorities for this comparative chart are included as endnotes
following the conclusion of this article.
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include:
•
a prison sentence of up to six months; or
a fine of not more than 360 times the daily fine rate
as set by the court.12

Primary Insider: Any person who has access
to inside information as a member of an
administrative, management or supervisory
body or an issuer or otherwise due to his
profession, employment, duties or share in
the capital of an issuer. Any person having
obtained inside information through criminal
acts shall also be deemed an insider.7
Secondary Insider: Any person who is
informed of or learns of inside information.8
Inside Information: Any information of a
precise nature, which has not been make
public and relates directly or indirectly to one
or more issuers of financial instruments or to
one or more financial instruments, and its
disclosure could have a significant effect on
the price of said financial instruments,
because said information would serve an
informed investor as a basis on which to
reach investment decisions.9

Belgium:
Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (“CBFA”)
Civilly Liable Conduct
Civil Penalties
Any person who is in possession of
information that he is aware, or ought to be
aware, is inside information may not:
•
acquire or dispose of, or try to acquire
or to dispose of, for his own account or
for the account of a third party, either
directly or indirectly, financial
instruments to which that information
refers, or related financial
instruments);13
•
disclose that information to any person,
unless such disclosure is made in the
normal course of the exercise of his
employment, profession or duties;14 or
•
recommend or induce a third party, on
the basis of that inside information, to
acquire or dispose of financial
instruments to which that information
refers, or related financial instruments.15
Inside Information: Any information of a
precise nature which has not been made
public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one
or more issuers of financial instruments or to
one or more financial instruments and which,
if it were made public, would be likely to
have a significant effect on the prices of those

Administrative penalties include a fine between
€2,500 and €2,500,000. If the infringement
resulted in the offender obtaining a capital gain,
that maximum shall be raised to twice the capital
gain, and in the event of a repeat offense, to three
times the capital gain.17
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financial instruments or on the price of
related financial instruments.16

Criminally Liable Conduct

Criminal Penalties

It is prohibited to engage in any of the insider
dealing offenses as defined by the civil
code.18

Criminal penalties include:
1) a prison sentence of between three months and
one year; or
2) a fine of €50 to €10,000.19

France:
Autorite des Marches Financiers (“AMF”)
Civilly Liable Conduct
Civil Penalties
Any insider, whether primary or secondary, is
prohibited from:
•
using inside information by acquiring or
disposing of, or by trying to acquire or
dispose of, for his or her own account or
for the account of a third party, either
directly or indirectly, financial
instruments to which that information
relates;
•
disclosing inside information to another
person, other than in the normal course
of his employment, profession or duties,
or for a purpose other than that for
which the information was disclosed to
him or her;
•
advising another person to buy or sell,
or to have bought or sold by another
person, on the basis of inside
information, the financial instruments to
which such information pertains or
related financial instruments.20
Primary Insider: Any person21 holding inside
information by virtue of membership of the
administrative, management or supervisory
bodies of the issuer; holding in the issuer's
capital; access to such information through
the exercise of the person’s employment,
profession or duties, as well as his or her
participation in the preparation or execution
of a corporate finance transaction; or
activities that may be characterized as crimes
or offenses.22
Secondary Insider: Any person who holds
inside information and who knows, or should
know, that is inside information.23
Inside Information: Any information of a
precise nature that has not been made public,
relating directly or indirectly to one or more
issuers of financial instruments, or to one of
more financial instruments, and which, if it
were made public, would be likely to have a
significant effect on the prices of the relevant
financial instruments or on the prices of
related financial instruments.24

Administrative penalties include:
•
an injunction to cease wrongful practices.25
•
emergency suspension (temporary) from
professional activities for regulated entities.26
•
a warning, reprimand, or temporary or
permanent prohibition from providing
professional services.27
•
monetary fines up to €1.5 million, or ten
times the amount of any profit realized in the
transaction.28
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Criminally Liable Conduct

Criminal Penalties

Before the public has knowledge of
privileged information, a primary insider may
not:
•
carry out or facilitate a “transaction”29
(“insider dealing”); or
•
communicate that information to a third
party outside the “normal framework of
his profession or his functions”
(“disclosure of insider information”).30

Criminal penalties for “inside dealing” include:
•
two years’ imprisonment; and
•
a fine of up to €1,500,000. This fine may be
increased by up to ten times the amount of
any profit realized, and shall never be less
than the amount of that same profit.34

Before the public has knowledge of
privileged information, a secondary insider
may not:
•
communicate, directly or indirectly,
privileged information to a third party
before the public has knowledge of the
information (“secondary insider
dealing”).31
Primary Insider: A person who, through his
or her employment, obtains privileged
information (either directly or through an
intermediary) concerning an issuer of
securities or the likely performance of a
financial instrument.32

Criminal penalties for “disclosure of inside
information” or “secondary insider dealing”
include:
•
one year’s imprisonment; and
•
a fine of up to €150,000.35
If the information in question is used in the
commission of a crime, such as where the person
who was tipped makes a trade on the information,
the tipper’s sentence shall be increased to seven
years’ imprisonment and a fine of €1,500,000, if
the amount of the profit realized is below that
figure. In such a situation, the tippee would be
liable for insider dealing, and would be punished
accordingly, up to two years in prison, and a fine
of €1,500,000 or more depending on the amount of
profit realized.36

Secondary Insider: Any person who
knowingly obtains privileged information
concerning an issuer of securities or the likely
performance of a financial instrument.33

Germany:
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (“BaFin”)
Civilly Liable Conduct
Civil Penalties
In addition to criminal sanctions, Germany
imposes administrative fines upon those in
violation of the provisions prohibiting the
disclosure of inside information and tipping.37

Administrative penalties include a fine not
exceeding € 50,000.38

Criminally Liable Conduct

Criminal Penalties

No person shall:
•
to make use of inside information to
acquire or dispose of insider securities
for one’s own account or on behalf of
another person (“insider dealing”);39
•
to disclose or make available inside
information to a third party without the
authority to do so (“disclosure of inside
information”);40
•
to recommend, on the basis of inside
information, that a third party acquire or
dispose of insider securities, or to
otherwise induce a third party to do so
(“tipping”).41

Criminal penalties include:
•
imprisonment up to five years;42 or
•
an unlimited fine. 43
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For a person to violate either the disclosure of
inside information provision, or the tipping
provision, he must have become privy to the
inside information: (a) by virtue of his
membership of the management or
supervisory body of the issuer, or as a
personally liable partner of the issuer, or of
an undertaking affiliated with the issuer; (b)
on the basis of his holding in the capital of
the issuer or a company affiliated with the
issuer; (c) on the basis of his profession,
activities, or “duties performed as part of his
function”; or (d) on the basis of a conspiracy
to perpetrate a crime.
A person need not have any particular
affiliation to be prosecuted for the insider
dealing provision. Thus, any person who
violates the insider dealing provision is
criminally liable for it, no matter how he
acquired the information involved.
Inside Information: Any specific information
about circumstances which are not public
knowledge relating to one or more issuers of
insider securities, or to the insider securities
themselves, which, if it became publicly
known, would likely have a significant effect
on the stock exchange or market price of the
security. Such a likelihood is deemed to exist
if a reasonable investor would take the
information into account for investment
decisions.44

Ireland:
Central Bank & Financial Services Authority (“CBFSA”)
Civilly Liable Conduct
Civil Penalties
An insider, either primary or secondary, in
possession of inside information may not,
directly or indirectly, for one’s own account
or for the account of a third party:
•
use that information to acquire, dispose
of, or attempt to acquire or dispose of,
financial instrument about which the
information relates;
•
disclose that information to any person
unless such disclosure is made in the
normal course of the exercise of the
insider’s employment, profession, or
duties;
•
recommend or induce another person,
on the basis of the inside information,
to acquire or dispose of financial
instruments to which that information
relates.45
Primary Insider: Anyone who possesses
inside information by virtue of the person’s

Administrative penalties include:
•
a fine of up to €2,500,000;49
•
compensation to any other party to the illegal
transaction who was not in possession of the
relevant information;50
•
compensation to the issuer of the relevant
financial instrument for any profit the guilty
party gained in the illegal transaction;51 or
•
sanctions imposed by the CBFSA including:
a private caution or reprimand; a public
caution or reprimand; a direction
disqualifying the guilty party from holding a
management position or having a qualifying
holding in any regulated financial service
provider for an amount of time to be
determined by the CBFSA; and a direction to
pay the CBFSA for all or a specified part of
the costs incurred in investigating and
prosecuting the matter.52
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membership in the administrative,
management or supervisory bodies of the
issuer of the financial instrument; the
person’s holdings in the capital of the issuer;
having access to information through the
exercise the person’s employment,
profession, or duties; or by virtue of the
person’s criminal activities.46
Secondary Insider: Any person who
possesses inside information and knows, or
ought to have known, that such is inside
information.47
Inside Information: Information which is of a
precise nature; relates, directly or indirectly,
to one or more issuers of financial
instruments or to one or more financial
instruments; has not been made public; and if
it were made public, would be likely to have
a significant effect on the price of those
financial instruments or of the related
derivative financial instruments.48

Criminally Liable Conduct
The same conduct is actionable with both
civil and criminal sanctions.

Criminal Penalties
If found guilty on conviction on indictment,
criminal penalties include:
•
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten
years;
•
a fine of €10,000,000; or
•
both.53
If found guilty on summary conviction, criminal
penalties include:
•
imprisonment for a term not exceeding
twelve months;
•
a fine of €5,000; or
•
both.54

Italy:
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (“CONSOB”)
Civilly Liable Conduct
Civil Penalties
An insider, primary or secondary, may not:
•
buy, sell or carry out other transactions
involving, directly or indirectly, for his
own account or for the account of a
third party, financial instruments using
such information;
•
disclose such information to others
outside the normal exercise of his
employment, profession, duties or
position; or
•
recommend or induce others, on the
basis of such information, to carry out
any of the transactions referred to in
subparagraph 1).
Primary Insider: A person who possesses
inside information by virtue of his
membership of the administrative,
management or supervisory bodies of an

Administrative penalties include:
•
a sanction of between €100,000 to
€15,000,000;59
•
temporary disqualification from position as
corporate officer or shareholder of authorized
intermediaries, market management
companies, auditors and financial salesmen.60
•
an order from CONSOB to authorized
intermediaries, market management
companies, listed issuers and auditing firms
not to use the offender in the exercise of their
activities for a period of not more than three
years and may request that the competent
professional associations suspend the
registrant from practice of the profession.61
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issuer, his holding in the capital of an issuer,
or the exercise of his employment,
profession, duties.55 Additionally, this
category includes any person who possesses
inside information by virtue of the
preparation of execution of criminal
activities.56
Secondary Insider: Any person who,
possessing inside information, and knowing
or capable of knowing through ordinary
diligence its inside nature, carries out any of
the actions described above.57
Inside Information: Information of a precise
nature which has not been made public
relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more
issuers of financial instruments or one or
more financial instruments and which, if it
were made public, would be likely to have a
significant effect on the prices of those
financial instruments. This includes
information a reasonable investor would be
likely to use as part of the basis of his
investment decisions.58

Criminally Liable Conduct

Criminal Penalties

The same conduct is actionable with both
civil and criminal sanctions.62 Criminal law,
however, does not penalize offenses by
secondary insiders.63

I Criminal penalties for any of the proscribed
activities include:
•
imprisonment for two to twelve years;
•
a fine of €40,000 to €6,000,000;64
•
confiscation of the proceeds of the crime or
the profit therefrom and the funds used to
commit the crime;65 or
ban from the securities profession, holding public
office, or exercising powers as a director, auditor,
receiver, general manager, or any other business
office.66

United Kingdom:
Financial Services Authority (“FSA”)
Civilly Liable Conduct
Civil Penalties
An insider may not:
•
deal (or attempt to deal) on the basis of
inside information relating to the
investment in question;
•
disclose inside information to another
person, other than in the proper course
of one’s employment; or
Anyone, whether or not an insider, may not:
•
base behavior on information not
generally available to those using the
market, but which, if available to a
regular user of the market, would likely
to be regarded as relevant to the market
decisions. The behavior also must be
likely to be regarded by a regular user

Administrative penalties include:
•
imposition by the FSA of “a penalty of such
amount as it considers appropriate”.70
•
a statement published by the FSA that the
person or entity has engaged in such
prohibited behavior.71 Any statement
published would be done in such a way as to
bring it to the attention of the public.72
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of the market as a failure to observe the
standard of behavior reasonably
expected of a person in his position.67
Insider: Anyone who has information: (1) as
a result of his membership of an
administrative, management, or supervisory
body of an issuer; (2) as a result of his status
as a shareholder; (3) as a result of having
access to the information by means of his
employment; (4) as a result of criminal
activities; or (4) which he has obtained by
other means, and which he could be
reasonably expected to know is insider
information.68
Insider Information: Information that: (1) is
precise in nature; (2) is not generally
available; (3) relates either directly or
indirectly to an issuer or investment; and (4)
is likely to have a significant effect on the
price of related investments, if it were to be
generally available.69

Criminally Liable Conduct

Criminal Penalties

A “person having information as an insider”
may not:
•
deal in securities that are price-affected
securities in relation to the information,
on a regulated market, through a
professional intermediary, or as a
professional intermediary;
•
encourage another person to deal in
price-affected securities in relation to
the information, having reasonable
cause to believe that the dealing would
take place on a regulated market or
through a professional intermediary;
•
disclose the information to another
person, other than in the proper
performance of one’s employment.73

If found guilty on conviction on indictment,
criminal penalties include:
•
a fine;
•
a term of imprisonment up to seven years; or
•
both.76

Person Having Information as an Insider: A
person who knows that the information he
possesses would be considered inside
information, and either he or his source
(which can be direct or indirect) obtained
such information from being a director,
employee, or shareholder of a securities
issuer, or from having access to the
information by virtue or his employment or
profession.74
Inside Information: Information which: (1)
relates to particular securities or issuers of
securities (or that issuer’s business
prospects); (2) is specific or precise in nature;
(3) has not been made public; and (4) if it
were to be made public, would be likely to
have a significant effect on the price or value
of securities.75

If found guilty of insider dealing on summary
conviction, criminal penalties include:
•
a fine;
•
a term of imprisonment up to 6 months; or
•
both.77
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IV. IMPLICATIONS IN UNITED STATES ENFORCEMENT
In contrast to European law, U.S. courts focus on the existence of
some form of fiduciary relationship rather than market fairness, creating
a conspicuous hole in the enforcement of insider trading laws. The
regime has created the paradoxical situation wherein an individual who
has obtained material non-public information in a legal manner may be
held criminally and civilly liable for trading on such information, while
one who has obtained the information in an illegal manner is entirely free
of U.S. insider trading liability. This anomaly, labeled by Judge
Buchwald in her Dorozhko opinion as the “inconvenient truth” of our
securities laws,130 has been and will continue to be exploited by
information thieves who apparently can trade on such information
without fear of reproach under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability.131
In this age of the internet, where information can be broadcast around the
world with the click of a button, or accessed by hackers skilled enough to
steal the information prior to broadcast, this loophole will continue to be
exploited.
In recent years, the Commission has brought suit in at least one
other instance in which it alleged that individuals acquired and exploited
material non-public information through acts of electronic theft.132 In
SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viiseman, the Commission alleged that
individual defendants Peek and Lepik, employees of co-defendant
Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, an Estonian financial services firm, were
engaging in a fraudulent scheme using a “spider” program to troll for
secure, password-protected confidential information through the website
of Business Wire, a leading distributor of regulatory filings and news
releases for companies throughout the world.133 Through their electronic
activity, the defendants were alleged to have accessed more than 360
confidential press releases about mergers, earnings announcements and
regulatory actions, from more than 200 public companies.134 This
130

Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *5.
Such hackers may still be liable under mail or wire fraud, and the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act. See Section IID. These charges, however, would need to be pursued by
the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), not the Commission. Although a crime
may have been committed in the actual theft of the information, the trade itself, as
discussed in this article, is not actionable.
132
SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viiseman, No. 05-9259, 2005 WL 3309748 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
133
SEC Litigation Release No. 19450 (Nov. 1, 2005), available online at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19450.htm (last visited June 5, 2009);
Complaint in SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemenn, No. 05-CV-9259, (Nov. 1, 2005),
available online at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19450.pdf (last visited
June 5, 2009).
134
Id.
131
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information allegedly enabled the defendants to “strategically time” their
stock positions around the public release of their previously acquired
information, resulting in gains in the millions of dollars.135 The
Commission’s allegations relied entirely on violations of Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.136
Ultimately, without admitting or denying the Commission’s
allegations, the defendants reached a settlement in which Peek and Lepik
agreed to disgorge $13,000,000 and $566,958, respectively, representing
their ill-gotten gains from the alleged scheme, in addition to civil
penalties of $1,350,000 and $15,000 respectively.137 Additionally,
Lohmus, Haavel & Viiseman consented to a civil penalty of $650,000.138
Despite this apparent victory for the Commission, the subsequent
and explicit precedent of Dorozhko will open the door for future
information thieves to exploit this method of profitable trading. Stories
already are appearing on the Internet, advertising the ease with which
profits can be made in this way, and the unlikelihood of federal charges
or civil claims based on insider trading.139 The fact remains that those
who obtain material non-public information in a lawful manner may be
held liable for a subsequent trade on such information, while those who
actively and criminally steal such information and perform the same
trade are entirely free from insider trading liability, is a contradiction
which will continue to be exploited. Such a paradox effectively has been
remedied by European jurisdictions, whose laws close this loophole.
Commentators have argued that the Commission could promulgate
further regulations interpreting Section 10(b) to define more explicitly
the boundaries of prohibited conduct.140 Regulations issued by the
Commission as an administrative agency of the Executive Branch,
however, may not extend beyond the confines of Section 10(b) itself in
terms of scope or authority, as set by Congress and defined by the
judiciary.141 Given the Supreme Court’s explicit determination that the
135

Id.
Id.
137
SEC Litigation Release. No. 20134 (May 31, 2007) available online at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20134.htm; SEC Litigation Release
No.19810 (Aug. 22, 2006), available online at http://www.sec.gov/litigation
/litreleases/2006/lr19810.htm (last visited June 5, 2009).
138
Id.
139
See, e.g., How to Beat an Insider Trading Rap at IB, http://www.elitetrader.com/
vb/showthread.php?threadid=132761 (last visited June 5, 2009); Gaming the Market:
How to Beat an Insider Trading Rap, http://www.gamingthemarket.com/2008/06/how-tobeat-an-insider-trading-rap.html ) (last visited June 5, 2009).
140
See Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 611 (2008) (arguing that
the Commission could promulgate another rule pertaining to insider trading liability in
the context of illegally obtained information, more clearly specify the bounds of the
prohibition, or create a “general parity-of-access rule”).
141
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651 (“Liability under Rule 10b-5 . . . does not extend
beyond conduct encompassed by § 10(b)’s prohibition.”); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at
136
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Exchange Act mandates a fiduciary duty, it is unlikely that a
Commission rule could withstand judicial scrutiny should it go so far as
to extend liability over those defendants with no fiduciary relationship at
all.
Similarly, short of an outright reversal by the Supreme Court,
judicial interpretation disposing of the fiduciary duty requirement is
unlikely to pass scrutiny. The Second Circuit currently has the
opportunity to diverge from precedent in finding Dorozhko liable for his
trades despite his lack of any duty to either the issuer or source of
information. Such an action, however, is unlikely given the explicit
instructions of the Supreme Court as discussed in Section II. Even if the
Second Circuit takes a renegade approach in moving toward a scheme of
market fairness under the Exchange Act as it did in Chiarella,142 it is
likely the Supreme Court’s reaction would be the same in rejecting “a
general duty between all participants in market transactions to forego
actions based on material non-public information.”143
Of course, Congress itself could take action in updating Section
10(b) to clarify the law and dispose of the fiduciary requirement.144 As
discussed in Section II above, the Exchange Act itself was largely a
reaction to the perceived corruption in the securities markets. In another
era of several high profile insider trading scandals during the eighties, a
bill entitled the “Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987” was
proposed by Senators Alfonso D’Amato (R-N.Y.) and Donald Riegle (DMich.),145 which would have codified an expanded definition of insider
trading.146 The definition would have explained that “information shall
have been used or obtained wrongfully only if it has been obtained by, or
its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, theft, conversion,
213–14 (internal quotations omitted) (“Rule 10b-5 was adopted pursuant to authority
granted the Commission under § 10(b). The rulemaking power granted to an
administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the
power to make law. Rather, it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the
will of Congress as expressed by the statute.”).
142
Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1362.
143
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
144
See Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec, and Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t
Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153
(1998)(explaining that confusion surrounds the requirement of “fiduciary duties having
nothing to do with corporate law,” and that lack of clear definitions in the enforcement
scheme should be remedied by an amendment to Section 10(b)); John I. McMahon, Jr., A
Statutory Definition of Insider Trading: The Need to Codify the Misappropriation
Theory, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 985, 1026 (1988) (arguing that, in the wake of the failed
Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987 and the Commission’s accompanying
proposals, a definitive legislative statement is necessary to clarify the law).
145
Roberta S. Karmel, Insider Trading: Law, Policy, and Theory after O’Hagan:
Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—a Breach In Search of a Duty, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 98–101 (1998) (explaining statutory developments pertaining to
insider trading law throughout the 1980’s).
146
S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987) reprinted in S. Hrg. 100-155, pt. 1, at 74 (1987).
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misappropriation or a breach of fiduciary, contractual, employment,
personal, or other relationship of trust and confidence.”147
The Commission objected to this definition, concerned that it would
limit its enforcement powers.148 The Commission responded with its own
proposed “Insider Trading Act of 1987,”149 stating that “[t]he fairness,
efficiency and integrity of the nation’s securities markets are impaired
when corporate insiders or other persons who obtain material non-public
information relating to an issuer or its securities wrongfully trade, or
wrongfully cause the trading of, securities while in possession of that
information.”150 With this goal, the Commission proposed that Section
10(b) be amended by adding that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to purchase [or] sell . . . any security while in
possession of material non-public information concerning the issuer or
its securities, if such person knows or recklessly disregards that such
information has been obtained” through a breach of duty,151 or, most
notably, through “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, or espionage through
electronic or other means.”152 Following Congressional hearings, the
Commission submitted a revised bill with similar language,153 but the
147

Id.
See Steinbuch, supra note 140, at 612.
Text of Draft “Insider Trading Act of 1987” submitted by SEC, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1284 (Aug. 14, 1987).
150
Id. at § 2(1).
151
Such duty may arise from any fiduciary, contractual, employment, personal or
other relationship with: (a) the issuer of the security or its security holders; (c) any person
planning or engaged in an acquisition or disposition of the issuer’s securities or assets; (c)
any government, or a political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of a government;
(d) any person, or any self-regulatory organization, registered or required to be registered
with the Commission under any provision of the federal securities laws; (e) any person
engaged in the business of gathering, analyzing, of disseminating information concerning
securities, the markets for securities, or the financial condition of issuers; (f) any other
person that is a member of a class that the Commission designates, by rule or regulation,
where the Commission finds (i) that the activities of the members of such class have a
regular nexus to the operation of the nation’s securities markets, and (ii) that such
designation is necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this Section; or (g)
any other person who obtained such information as a result of a direct or indirect
confidential relationship with any of the persons or entities referred to in the previous
categories. Id. at § 3(a)(2).
152
Id. at § 3(a)(1).
153
19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1817 (Nov. 27, 1987), Section (b)(1) (“It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or
sale of, any security, while in possession of material, non-public information relating
thereto, if such person knows or recklessly disregards that such information has been
obtained wrongfully, or that such purchase or sale would constitute a wrongful use of
such information. For the purposes of this subsection, such trading while in possession of
material, non-public information is wrongful only if such information has been obtained
by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, (A) theft, bribery misrepresentation,
espionage (through electric or other means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation, or any
other breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of any personal or other relationship of trust and
confidence, or breach of any contractual or employment relationship.”).
148
149
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definition proved too controversial, and no further steps were taken with
respect to the bill.154 No further attempts by Congress or the Commission
have been made to update the laws since. The proposed definitions,
however, are remarkably similar to those eventually adopted by the E.U.,
and would have covered cases such as Dorozhko and Blue Bottle.
As with the Exchange Act, the proposed Insider Trading
Proscriptions Act, and the recent and hotly-debated Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
promulgated in the wake of a mass of corporate scandals, the slow but
heavy hand of Congress waits for public outrage at corporate corruption
to push it into action.155 Whether cases such as Dorozhko, or more likely
those who will inevitably follow his lead to garner far larger profits, will
incite public outcry remains a question for the future. In the meantime, in
stark contrast to the laws of the E.U., the winding path of judicial
interpretation in the United States will continue to “define” insider
trading based on the existence of a fiduciary duty until Congress adopts
legislation substantially similar to its previous proposals, or which at
least includes more clearly delineated definitions.156
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, given the enduring requirement of a breach of duty
under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, as discussed in Section II
supra, the case of SEC v. Dorozhko illustrates the gap in U.S. insider
trading liability through which “true outsiders” of a company may not be
154
See Karmel, supra note 145, at 100. Controversy over whether the statutory
definition of insider trading should be limited to prohibiting one from “use” of the
information in trading or merely “possession” of it resulted in deadlock, and no definition
was created. Thomas Lee Hazen, United States v. Chestman—Trading Securities on the
Basis of Nonpublic Information in Advance of a Tender Offer, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 595,
615 (1991).
155
Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a
Global Economy, 37 IND. L. REV. 141, 144 (2003) (“In response to these corporate
debacles (and to Enron in particular), Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”); Mark
Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 632 (December 2003) (noting that
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a reaction to “Enron-era scandals”); Robert
Wright, Enron: The Ambitious and the Greedy, 16 W.R.L.S.I. 71, 72 (2003)(“As it turns
out, Enron and the high-risk accounting practices that allowed it to inflate shareholder
equity by $ 1.2 billion was just the tip of the iceberg; similar scandals were soon
discovered at WorldCom and Global Crossing. And the corporate malfeasance did not
stop there: some 250 American public companies will have to restate their accounts this
year, compared with only 92 in 1997 and three in 1981. The United States Congress
responded. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act became law in July 2002, making sweeping changes
to American securities law . . . .”).
156
“Virtually every other country that has joined the United States in prohibiting
trading on the basis of material, non-public information has done so through statutes that
define with specificity such terms as “insider” and “inside information” as well as the
circumstances in which trading is prohibited . . . The United States stands alone in
allowing judges to develop a common law prohibition against insider trading.” Painter
et. al, supra note 144, at 210.
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held accountable for trading on material non-public information. To the
contrary, the E.U. recently imposed a scheme of general fairness in the
marketplace, focusing on the imbalance of information when a trade
occurs rather than any specific relationship between the parties involved
and the issuer, as discussed in Section III supra. Until the Supreme Court
expands its previous interpretation or Congress acts to amend and update
the law, data thieves in the U.S. may continue to steal and trade on
material non-public information without fear of reprisal under the
Exchange Act.
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National Legislation Implementing the European Union
Directive 2003/6/EC on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation
Reference and Authority
1

Austrian Stock Exchange Act Art. 48q.
Id. at Art. 48q(4).
3
The exchange operating company may be any legal entity that manages
and/or operates a regulated market or anyone who operates any other securities
exchange or general commodities exchange. Id. at Art. 2.
4
Id. at Art. 48q(3).
5
Id. at Art. 48b(1).
6
Id. at Art. 48b(3).
7
Austrian Stock Exchange Act 48b(4). In the case of a legal entity, those
natural persons shall be considered insiders who were involved in the decision to
carry out a transaction for the account of the legal entity. Id.
8
Id. at Art. 48b(2).
9
Id. at Art. 48a(1)(1).
10
Id. at Art. 48b(1).
11
Id. at Art. 48b(2). A “daily rate” is determined based on the economic
circumstances of the perpetrator and can be set between €2 and €500. Austrian
Penal Code Art. 19(2).
12
Law on the Supervision of the Financial Sector and on Financial
Services, Chapt. II, Art. 48(3).
13
Id. at Art. 25 § 1(a). Where the individual involved in this situation is a
legal entity, this prohibition also applies to the natural persons who partake in
the decision to carry out the transaction on behalf of the legal entity involved.
Id. at Art. 25 § 2.
14
Id. at Art. 25 § 1(b).
15
Id. at Art. 25 § 1(c).
16
Law on the Supervision of the Financial Sector and on Financial
Services, Chapt. II, Art. 2 § 14.
17
Id. at Art. 36 § 2.
18
Id. at Art. 40 §§ 1–3.
19
Id. at Art. 43; Committee of European Securities Regulators, Report on
Administrative Measures and Sanctions as well as the Criminal Sanctions
available in Member States under the Market Abuse Directive (Oct. 17, 2007).
An offender also may be ordered to pay a fine of up to triple the capital gain that
he has obtained through his infringement. Id.
20
Law on the Supervision of the Financial Sector and on Financial
Services, Chapt. II, Art. 622-1.
21
Where the person is a legal person, the described prohibitions also apply
to natural persons taking part in the decision to effect the transaction on behalf
of such legal person. Id. at Art. 622-2.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at Art. 621-1. Information is deemed to be precise if it indicates a set
of circumstances or event that has occurred or is likely to occur and a conclusion
may be drawn as to the possible effect of such set of circumstances or event on
2
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the prices of financial instruments or related financial instruments. Information
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the
prices of financial instruments or related derivative financial instruments is
information that a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis
of his investment decisions. Id.
25
Monetary and Financial Code (2005) L621-14. Like the SEC power
within the United States, the AMF may order a person to cease all practices
contrary to the laws of regulations intended to protect investors from insider
trading. This decision can be made public. Id.
26
Id. at L621-15. During AMF enforcement proceedings, the AMF Board
may suspend the professionals involved in the investigation (which includes
legal entities, and the natural persons who work on their behalf). Id.
27
Id. at L621-15 III. The sanction decision may be published. Id.
28
Id. at L621-15 III. The monetary penalty involved is to be
“commensurate with the seriousness of the breaches committed and any
advantages or profits derived from those breaches.” Id.
29
Monetary and Financial Code (2005) at L465-1. Although the code itself
does not specify that the transaction must be related to the privileged
information the individual possessed at the time, this is assumed by practitioners
in France. Bender, Doing Business in France §14.05 (2007).
30
Monetary and Financial Code (2005) at L465-1.
31
Id. at L465-3.
32
Id. at L465-1.
33
Id.
34
Id. at L465-1.
35
Monetary and Financial Code (2005) at L465-1.
36
Id.
37
Securities Trading Act (“WpHG”) § 39(2) no.3-4. Here, there is no
requirement of any particular affiliation (to the issuer, through the person’s
employment, or to a conspiracy), as is required to violate the criminal
counterparts of these laws.
38
Id. at § 39.
39
Id. at § 14(1) no. 1. Violation of the insider dealing provision can be
prosecuted for a negligent state of mind. Id. at § 38(4). However, the
punishment imposed for violations of intentional insider dealing can be up to
five times higher than merely negligent conduct. Id. at § 38(1) no.1.
40
Id. at § 14(1) no. 2. It should be noted that the provisions prohibiting the
disclosure of inside information and tipping require an intentional act. Id. at §
38 (1) no. 2.
41
Id. at §14(1) no. 3.
42
If, however, an offence is committed through negligence, the punishment
shall not exceed one year in prison or a criminal fine. Monetary and Financial
Code (2005) at § 38(4).
43
Id. at § 38.
44
Id. at §13(1). Information is “likely to have a significant effect on the
stock exchange or market price” when a reasonable investor would take the
information into account for investment decisions. Id. at §13(1).
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Id. at §§ 5(1)-(2). This prohibition does not apply to any transaction
conducted in the discharge of an obligation to acquire or dispose of any financial
instrument, which has become due, and results from an agreement concluded
before the person concerned came into possession of the relevant inside
information. Id. at § 5(5).
46
Id. at § 5(3)(a). If the person falling into any of the above four categories
is a legal entity, then any natural person who takes part in the decision to carry
out, for the account of the legal entity, any transaction in financial instruments is
also considered an insider. Id. at § 5(3)(b).
47
Monetary and Financial Code (2005) at § 5(3)(c).
48
Id. at § 2(1).
49
Monetary and Financial Code (2005) at § 41(c).
50
Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2005, §
33(1)(a). The guilty party shall pay for any loss sustained by the counterparty
by reason of a difference between the price at which the relevant financial
instruments were traded and the price at which they would have been likely to
have been traded if the relevant information was generally available. Id.
51
Id. at § 33(1)(b).
52
Irish Market Abuse Law, § 41.
53
Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2005,
§ 32.
54
Irish Market Abuse Law, § 49.
55
Unified Financial Act Art. 187-bis(1).
56
Id. at Art. 187-bis(2).
57
Id. at Art. 187-bis(4).
58
Id. at Art. 181(1)-(4).
59
Id. at 187-bis(1); Art. 39(3) of Law 262/2005. The fine may be increased
by three to ten times the product of the offense or the profit therefrom when the
maximum fine appears inadequate in view of seriousness of the offense, the
personal situation of the guilty party, or the magnitude of the product of the
offense or the profit therefrom. Unified Financial Act, Art. 187(2). Pecuniary
administrative sanctions for insider trading always include the confiscation of
the product of the offense or the profit therefrom and the property used to
commit it. If it is not possible to recover the proceeds or profit, a sum of money
or property of equivalent value may be confiscated. Unified Financial Act, Art.
187(6).
60
Unified Financial Act at Art. 187(4).
61
Id.
62
Id. at Art. 184.
63
Id.
64
Id. at Art. 184(1); Art. 39(1) of Law 262/2005. The fine may be
increased by the court to three to ten times the product of the crime or the profit
therefrom when the maximum fine appears inadequate in view of the
seriousness of the offense, the personal situation of the guilty party, or the
magnitude of the product of the crime or the profit therefrom. Unified Financial
Act, Art. 184(3).
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Unified Financial Act Art. 187. Where it is not possible to recover the
proceeds or profit, a sum of money or property of equivalent value may be
confiscated. Id.
66
Id. at Art. 186. These accessory penalties remain in force for between six
months and two years. C.P. Book I, Title II, Chapter II, Section III, Art. 28, 30,
32(2), 32(3).
67
Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000, Ch. 8 § 118. The conduct is
proscribed whether it occurs in relation to a person’s affirmative action or
inaction. Id. at § 130A(3).
68
Id. at § 118B.
69
Id. at §§ 118C(1)-(2).
70
Id. at § 123. In deciding the proper penalty, the FSA looks to whether
the conduct had an adverse effect on the market, the extent to which the conduct
was deliberate or reckless, and whether the guilty party is a person or business
entity. Id. at § 124.
71
Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000, Ch. 8 § 123(3).
72
Id. at § 124(7).
73
Criminal Justice Act 1993, Ch. 36 § 52.
74
Id. at § 57(2).
75
Id. at §§ 56(1); 60(4).
76
Id. at § 61(1)(b).
77
Id. at § 61(1)(a).

